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Auditing Implications Derived from a Review 
of Cases and Articles Relating to Fraud 
W. Steve Albrecht* 
Marshall B. Romney* 
Brigham Young University 
For the past two years an interdisciplinary team of researchers1 has been stud-
ying the problem of management fraud. The motivation for the study was 
threefold: a noted increase in the number of management frauds being committed, 
an increased awareness of auditors' responsibilities for detecting frauds, and a 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. research grant. The objectives of the research 
were: (1) to conduct an extensive interdisciplinary review of the fraud related 
literature, (2) to identify individual, organizational, and societal factors that sug-
gest a high probability of fraud, (3) to partially validate these factors by comparing 
them to past cases of fraud, and (4) to organize these factors into an early warning 
system that could be used by auditors in detecting and deterring fraud. 
In completing the first objective, four data sources were investigated: (1) over 
1500 literature references (books, journal and magazine articles, monographs, 
newspaper citations, and unpublished working papers) were reviewed,2 (2) fraud 
perpetrators and victims were interviewed, (3) 65 organizations concerned with 
the detection, deterrence, prosecution, or punishment of fraud were visited in per-
son or contacted by mail or telephone, and (4) numerous legal and organizational 
documents (prison and parole records, Donn Parker's extensive files on computer 
fraud, and corporate records) were examined. 
In completing the second objective, a comprehensive list of all variables which 
appeared to influence or be associated with the perpetration of fraud was compiled 
as the data sources were examined. The variables identified were classified into 
three major categories: societal, organizational, and individual factors. During this 
process, patterns and relationships among the variables emerged and a tentative 
model explaining fraud was developed. 
The third objective, validating the fraud-related variables, involved examining 
72 past cases of fraud. Twenty of the cases came from Donn Parker's files (Stan-
ford Research Institute) and 52 cases came from published accounts3 of fraud. 
Each case was carefully analyzed to determine which of the items on the master 
list of variables appeared to be present in the case. A t the completion of this proc-
ess, each item on the master list was carefully reviewed and the master list revised. 
* This project was funded by a grant from the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Foundation through its 
Research Opportunities in Auditing program. The views expressed herein are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Foundation. 
101 
In revising the list, only those variables that could be associated with at least one 
case were kept. This is a very demanding criterion because certainly the authors 
who wrote about the cases probably had a perspective much different than ours. 
After completing the compiling and validation steps, a fraud checklist4 (objec-
tive 4) for use by auditors was developed. This checklist, which includes both 
questions auditors will ask themselves about the client and the client about 
themselves, should make auditors more aware of the possibility of fraud and hence 
increase the probability that fraud will be detected. The checklist includes both 
factors that could motivate an employee to commit fraud against a company for 
his own benefit and an executive to commit fraud on behalf of a corporation. 
The purpose of this paper is to present some conclusions and implications 
from the study that should be helpful to auditors. In presenting these implications, 
two assumptions will be made: 
(1) It is assumed that readers are aware of auditors' responsibilities for the 
detection of fraud as stated in the SAS's, Cohen Commission Report, 
and various court opinions. 
(2) It is assumed that readers agree with our definition of management 
fraud. The definition used (Improper actions resulting in a material 
misstatement of financial statements) excludes several types of 
criminal acts that have been classified as fraud. Some of the more com-
mon omissions are consumer fraud, false advertising, embezzlement, 
bribes, kickbacks, and violations of regulatory agency rules.5 
The remainder of this paper will be divided into three parts: (1) a description 
or profile of the typical fraud perpetrator, (2) an explanation of why fraud occurs, 
and (3) steps that can be taken by auditors to reduce their exposure to manage-
ment fraud. 
The Typical Fraud-Perpetrator 
One aspect of the study was an attempt to describe fraud perpetrators as a 
group and differentiate them from other groups. This task was extremely difficult 
because there are not many fraud perpetrators available to study. Two reasons ac-
counted for the sparsity of available subjects: our narrow definition of fraud 
eliminated many potential perpetrators, and most fraud perpetrators are never in-
carcerated. In trying to compile a sample, we contacted over 400 prisons nation-
wide as well as every state and federal probation and parole department in the U.S. 
and Canada. Many of the agencies and prisons responded that they could not com-
ply with our request because of one or more of the following reasons: (1) they had 
no fraud perpetrators fitting our description, (2) fraud perpetrators could be listed 
under many different crime categories, (3) they had no computerized files or 
organized data on fraud perpetrators, (4) our request would take too much time, 
or (5) responding to our request might violate security or privacy laws. As a 
result, our definition of fraud had to be expanded to include embezzlers who were 
in managerial positions. Thus, in describing fraud perpetrators, management 
fraud perpetrators and managerial embezzlers were compared with prisoners in-
carcerated for other property offenses (theft, burglary, larceny, bank robbery, 
etc.), and a sample of college students. The three groups were compared across 
several demographic, personal, and psychological characteristics. 
The results indicated that incarcerated fraud perpetrators were generally dif-
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ferent than other incarcerated prisoners and quite similar to the college students. 
When compared to other property offenders, fraud perpetrators were less likely to 
be caught, turned in, arrested, convicted, incarcerated, or to serve long sentences. 
The fraud perpetrators were also considerably older, which might be expected 
since it usually takes longer to get into managerial positions or other positions of 
trust. While only two percent of the property offenders were female, 30 percent of 
the fraud perpetrators were women. The fraud perpetrators tended to have a much 
more stable family situation; more were married, they had more children, were 
less likely to be divorced, and more likely to be active church attenders. 
Compared to other property offenders, the fraud perpetrators were better 
educated, more religious, less likely to have a criminal record or otherwise be 
criminally inclined, less likely to use alcohol, and considerably less likely to use 
drugs. Fraud perpetrators were in better psychological health. They enjoyed more 
optimism, self-esteem, self-sufficiency, achievement, motivation, and family har-
mony in contrast to the other property offenders who showed more depression, 
self-degradation, dependence, lack of motivation, and family discord. Fraud 
perpetrators seemed to have significantly fewer problems; they expressed more 
social conformity, self-control, kindness, and empathy while other property of-
fenders displayed greater social deviancy, impulsiveness, hostility, and insensitiv-
ity to other people. 
When compared to college students, the fraud perpetrators differed only 
slightly. The white-collar criminals suffered more psychic pain, were more 
dishonest, were more independent, more sexually mature, more socially deviant, 
and more empathetic. The comparisons showed that fraud perpetrators were 
much more similar to the students than to other property offenders. In fact, in 
most cases, they were so different from other criminals, that when incarcerated, 
they tended to associate more with prison guards and officials than with other 
prisoners. This part of the study produced one other interesting observation. 
While most of the fraud perpetrators had virtually no criminal background, there 
was a small minority that had several previous arrests and convictions. From this 
observation it might be hypothesized that there are really two types of 
perpetrators: the typical business person who succumbs to pressures or tempta-
tions, and the more criminally-inclined person who would be dishonest in most 
environments or would commit fraud as just one more in a series of offenses. 
A n Explanation of Fraud 
With all of these positive characteristics, why do these "non-criminal" type 
managers and executives get involved in fraud? Basically, they become involved 
because: (1) they are placed in situations where they are faced with a high degree 
of situational pressure; (2) they are faced with attractive opportunities to commit, 
conceal, or not be punished for their illegal acts; or (3) they have a low level of per-
sonal integrity or honesty. These three forces interact to determine whether or 
not a person will commit fraud. A person with a high level of integrity and little 
opportunity and pressure to commit fraud will most likely behave honestly. But 
criminal acts become increasingly likely as individuals with lower levels of per-
sonal honesty are placed in situations with increased pressure or convenient op-
portunities to commit a crime. Exhibit A is a graphic description of the interaction 
of the fraud motivating forces. 
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Exhibit A 
(High) Situational Pressures (Low) 
(High) Opportunities (Low) 
(Low) Personal Characteristics (Integrity) (High) 
Fraud No Fraud 
The forces that contribute to these three motivations are largely determined at 
three levels: society, the work place, and personal experiences. What is frighten-
ing is that the forces causing an increase in fraud are greater than ever today and 
are increasing on all three levels. The societal factors, which contribute to fraud 
by either increasing overall opportunities or creating situational pressures, provide 
a backdrop for the work place and personal factors. Exhibit B depicts this relation-
ship. 
There are at least eight societal factors that contribute to lowering the general 
level of honesty and magnifying the pressures and opportunities experienced by 
managers at work and in their personal lives. These factors7 are: (1) failure of 
businesses to prosecute, (2) problems with our ciminal justice system, (3) ostra-
cism of whistle blowers, (4) a lowered level of personal integrity, (5) inflation, (6) 
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Exhibit B 
SOCIETY 
Personal Experiences 
Situational Pressures 
Work Place 
Personal Experiences 
Opportunities Fraud 
Work Place 
Personal Honesty 
increased size of organizational units, (7) increased use of computers, and (8) pro-
liferation of egalitarian ideas. 
Certainly, it would be difficult for auditors to change many of these societal 
factors. Maybe a strong lobbying effort or high placed connections could help, but 
generally auditors must live with these factors. 
The combination of increased responsibilities to detect fraud, increased 
societal reinforcement for fraud, and the absence of an obvious criminal type pro-
file makes it imperative that auditors make fraud detection an explicit part of their 
audit. We believe there are two steps auditors must take to reduce their exposure 
to fraud. First, they must make sure that only "clean" firms are accepted as 
clients. Many well known frauds have involved new clients (e.g., Home-Stake 
Production, National Student Marketing, Republic National Life, and Stirling 
Homex). We have previously argued8 for the use of investigative agencies as a bet-
ter way to screen potential new clients. A thorough review of prospective clients 
should help to eliminate exposure to those frauds committed by the criminally-
inclined perpetrators. 
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Secondly, auditors can pay much closer attention to situational pressures and 
opportunities experienced by managers at both the work place and in their per-
sonal lives. One way to focus on these factors would be to include a "red flag" 
checklist as part of the audit program. Presently, there are several such checklists 
available.9 One rather comprehensive checklist that includes situational pressure, 
opportunity, and personal characteristic red flags is included in Exhibit C. 
Exhibit C 
Situational Pressure Red Flags 
Personal Situational Pressures 
1. High personal debts or financial losses 
2. Inadequate incomes 
3. Living beyond one's means 
4. Extensive stock market or other speculation 
5. Excessive gambling 
6. Involvement with members of the opposite sex 
7. Undue family, company, or community expectations 
8. Excessive use of alcohol or drugs 
9. Perceived inequities in the organization 
10. Resentment of superiors 
11. Frustration with the job 
12. Peer group pressures 
13. Greed or desire for self-enrichment and personal gain 
Company Situational Pressures 
1. Unfavorable economic conditions within the industry 
2. Heavy investments or losses 
3. Insufficient working capital 
4. Dependence on one or two products, customers, or transactions 
5. Excess capacity 
6. Severe obsolescence 
7. High debt 
8. Extremely rapid expansion through new business or product lines 
9. Reduced ability to acquire credit 
10. Profit squeeze (costs and expenses rising higher and faster than sales and 
revenues) 
11. Difficulty in collecting receivables 
12. Unusually heavy competition 
13. Restrictive loan agreements 
14. Progressive deterioration in quality of earnings 
15. Significant tax adjustments 
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16. Urgent need for favorable earnings (to support high price of stock, meat 
earnings forecast, etc.) 
17. Need to gloss over a temporarily bad situation (in order to maintain 
management position and prestige) 
18. Significant litigation (especially between stockholders and management) 
19. Unmarketable collateral 
20. Significant reduction in sales backlogs indicating future sales decline 
21. Long business cycle 
22. Existence of revocable and possible imperiled licenses (especially when 
necessary for the continuation of business) 
23. Suspension or delisting from a stock exchange 
24. Pressure to merge 
25. Sizable inventory increase without comparable sales increases 
Opportunity Red Flags 
Personal Opportunities 
1. Extensive familiarity with operations (including cover-up capabilities) and in 
a position of trust 
2. Close association with cohorts, suppliers, and other key people 
3. A firm which does not inform employees about rules and disciplinary 
actions of fraud perpetrators 
4. A firm in which there is rapid turnover (quit or fired) of key employees 
5. A firm in which there are no annual vacations or transfers 
6. A firm which does not use adequate personnel screening policies when 
hiring new employees to fill positions of trust 
7. A firm in which there is an absence of explicit and uniform personnel 
policies 
8. A firm which does not maintain accurate personnel records of dishonest 
acts or disciplinary actions for such things as alcoholism and/or drug abuse 
9. A firm which does not require executive disclosures and examinations 
10. A firm which has a dishonest management and/or environment 
11. A firm which has a dominant top management 
12. A firm which is always operating on a crisis basis 
13. A firm which pays no attention to details 
14. A firm in which there is too much trust in key employees 
15. A firm in which there are few interpersonal relationships 
16. A firm which has unrealistic productivity measurements 
17. A firm which has poor compensation practices 
18. A firm in which there are no vested employee interests 
19. A firm which has inadequate training programs 
Company Opportunities 
1. A firm which has related party transactions 
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2. A firm which has a very complex business structure 
3. A firm which does not have an effective internal auditing staff 
4. A highly computerized firm 
5. A firm in atypical or ' 'hot" industries 
6. A firm which uses several different auditing firms or changes auditors often 
7. A firm which has a reluctance to give auditors needed data 
8. A firm which uses a large number of banks none of which can see the entire 
picture 
9. A firm with inadequate internal controls 
10. A firm which uses unduly liberal accounting practices 
11. A firm which has poor accounting records 
12. A firm which has inadequate staffing in the accounting department 
13. A firm which inadequately discloses unusual accounting practices 
Personal Characteristic Red Flags 
1. A person with low moral character (possessing deceptive or dishonest 
tendencies, for example) 
2. A person who rationalizes his contradictory behavior 
3. A person without a strong code of personal ethics 
4. A person who is a "wheeler dealer'' (someone who has a desire for power, 
influence, or social status) 
5. A person who lacks stability (employment history, etc.) 
6. A person with a strong desire to beat the system 
7. A person with a criminal or questionable background 
8. A person with poor credit rating and financial status 
The "red flag'' list provided in Exhibit C is the one developed by the authors. It 
is more comprehensive than other available lists and does have the advantage of 
having been partially validated. To illustrate how relevant these red flags have 
been to past cases of fraud, we have selected 27 of the 72 cases studied and ex-
amined their relevance to these red flags. The 27 cases are listed in Exhibit D . 
Exhibit D 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
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Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Ultramares 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
A l l the publicly available literature on these cases was reviewed to see if any 
explicit mention of these factors could be found. While the results that follow (Ex-
hibit E—at end of paper) indicate that almost all of the red flags were mentioned in 
the writings about many of the 27 cases, the absence of a case from a given red 
flag does not mean the red flag was not a factor in the case. Certainly, the authors 
who wrote about the cases had a perspective much different than ours and thus 
the mention of the variables in the publicly available literature is a very demand-
ing criterion. 
It is quite obvious that these "red flags" can be associated with many of the 
major past cases of fraud. While this association doesn't guarantee that future 
frauds will also have these relationships, it does seem that auditors should pay 
some attention to these facts. While auditors have given heed to many of the op-
portunity factors (through internal control checks) and recently even examined 
some of the firm pressures, there are many of these factors that have not been ex-
plicitly considered. 
We realize that it would be difficult to investigate many of these variables. Cer-
tainly, most auditors will and probably should be reluctant to probe managers 
about their personal gambling and sex habits. However, we would argue that the 
decision of whether or not to use these factors is a cost-benefit question. We are 
convinced that more frauds could be detected earlier if these red flags were used. 
We also recognize the costs involved in doing so. Thus, only when the perceived 
benefits exceed the perceived costs should they be used. Also, the cost of using the 
various red flags is not equal. Some have relatively low costs while the costs of 
others may be almost prohibitive. In general, we would argue that auditors should 
look at each red flag from a cost-benefit perspective. 
We also realize that even if used, the presence of one or even all of these red 
flags doesn't necessarily guarantee the existence of fraud. We would argue that as 
the number of red flags increases, the probability of fraud increases. At best, 
however, the red flags can only be viewed as a risk-evaluation tool. Also, the 
relevance and fraud predictability of the red flags haven't yet been assessed. Cer-
tainly, some are "better" than others. We are presently working on a discrimi-
nant approach that should provide insight into which "red flags" are the best 
fraud predictors. 
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Concluding Comments 
Management fraud is a major problem that concerns auditors. The auditing 
literature, standards, and court cases expect auditors to assume more responsibil-
ity for its detection. Management fraud will continue to increase because society 
reinforces those factors which contribute to fraud. Fraud perpetrators generally 
have personal characteristics that are typical to those of college students, and most 
likely, the general population. They have personal characteristics much different 
than other property offenders. There are three factors that contribute to fraud: (1) 
situational pressures, (2) opportunities, and (3) personal honesty. Because of the 
combination of more responsibility for fraud detection, increasing reinforcement 
for fraud, and the absence of a "criminal type" profile, it is critical that auditors 
become better fraud detectives. Two ways to be better detectives are: (1) to better 
screen potential new clients, and (2) to look for situational pressure, opportunity, 
and personal characteristic red flags both in organizations and in managers' and 
executives' personal lives. 
Exhibit E 
Situational Pressure Red Flags 
Personal Situational Factors 
1. High Personal Debts or Financial 
Losses 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Hochfelder 
Stirling Homex 
Vesco 
2. Inadequate Incomes 
Vesco 
3. Living Beyond One's Means 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
4. Extensive Stock Market 
Speculation 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
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McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Vesco 
5. Excessive Gambling 
Four Seasons 
Penn Central 
Vesco 
6. Involvement with Members of 
Opposite Sex 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Equity Funding 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
7. Undue Family, Company, or 
Community Expectations 
Ampex 
Black Watch 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Yale Express 
8. Excessive Usage of Alcohol or 
Drugs 
Equity Funding 
9. Perceived Inequities in 
Organization 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Equity Funding 
McKesson & Robbins 
Vesco 
10. Resentment of Superiors 
Vesco 
11. Frustration with Job 
None of the 27 major cases 
12. Peer Group Pressures 
Equity Funding 
Stirling Homex 
13. Greed or Desire for Self 
Enrichment or Gain 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Company Situational Pressures 
1. Unfavorable Economic Conditions 
in Industry 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Westec 
Yale Express 
2. Heavy Investments or Losses 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
3. Insufficient Working Capital 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Yale Express 
4. Dependence on Single Products, 
Customers, or Transactions 
Allied Crude Vegetable 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
McKesson & Robbins 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
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Westgate 
5. Excess Capacity 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Yale Express 
6. Severe Obsolescence 
Ampex 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Stirling Homex 
7. High Debt 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
8. Extremely Rapid Expansion 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
9. Reduced Ability to Acquire Credit 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Westec 
Yale Express 
10. Profit Squeeze 
Ampex 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Yale Express 
11. Difficulty Collecting Receivables 
Ampex 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Yale Express 
12. Unusually Heavy Competition 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
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Yale Express 
13. Restrictive Loan Agreements 
Ampex 
McKesson & Robbins 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
14. Deterioration in Quality of 
Earnings 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westec 
15. Significant Tax Adjustments 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
16. Urgent Need for Favorable 
Earnings 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
17. Need to Gloss Over Temporarily 
Bad Situation 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
18. Significant Litigation 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Home-Stake 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Talley Industries 
19. Unmarketable Collateral 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Republic National Life 
20. Significant Reduction in Sales 
Backlog 
BarChris 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
21. Long Business Cycle 
Ampex 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Stirling Homex 
22. Existence of Imperiled Licenses 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Four Seasons 
Republic National Life 
23. Suspension From Stock Exchange 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
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Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
24. Pressure to Merge 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Talley Industries 
Westec 
25. Sizable Inventory Increase 
No major cases 
Opportunity Red Flags 
Personal Opportunities 
1. Familiarity With Operations 
(Cover Up Ability) 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
2. Close Association With Cohorts 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
3. Doesn't Inform About Rules For 
Fraud 
Equity Funding 
4. Rapid Turnover of Key People 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Stirling Homex 
Vesco 
5. No Mandatory Vacations or 
Transfers 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
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Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
6. No Adequate Screening Policies 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
7. Absence of Explicit Personnel 
Policies 
Equity Funding 
8. Doesn't Maintain Adequate 
Personnel Records 
Equity Funding 
McKesson & Robbins 
9. No Executive Disclosure 
Requirements 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
Hochfelder 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Westec 
Westgate 
10. Unethical Management 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
11. Dominant Top Management 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
12. Operates on a Crisis Basis 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
13. Pays No Attention to Details 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Ultramares 
14. Too Much Trust in Key 
Employees 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Continental Vending 
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Equity Funding 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
15. Low Interpersonal Relationships 
Ampex 
Equity Funding 
Penn Central 
Yale Express 
16. Unrealistic Productivity 
Measurements 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
Four Seasons 
Talley Industries 
17. Poor Compensation Practices 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Home-Stake 
18. Lack of Internal Security 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
19. Inadequate Training Programs 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Yale Express 
Company Opportunities 
1. Related Party Transactions 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
2. Complex Business Structure 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Cenco 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
3. No Effective Internal Auditors 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
4. Highly Computerized Firm 
Cenco 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
5. Atypical or "Hot'' Industries 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
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Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Stirling Homex 
6. Different Auditors or Change of 
Auditors Often 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Republic National Life 
Westgate 
7. Reluctance to Give Auditors 
Needed Data 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale 
8. Large Number of Banks 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Westec 
9. Inadequate Internal Controls 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
Black Watch Farms 
Equity Funding 
Hochfelder 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
10. Unduly Liberal Accounting 
Practices 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
11. Poor Accounting Records 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
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Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Yale Express 
12. Inadequate Staffing in Accounting 
Department 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Cenco 
National Student Marketing 
13. Inadequate Disclosure of Unusual 
Accounting Practices 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Personal Characteristics Red Flags 
1. Low Moral Character 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Vesco 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
2. Rationalizer 
Equity Funding 
Westgate 
3. No Strong Code of Personal Ethics 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Equity Funding 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Vesco 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
4. Wheeler-Dealer 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
HomeStake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
5. Lacks Stability 
Equity Funding 
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7. Criminal or Questionable 
6. Strong Desire to Beat System 
McKesson & Robbins 
Background 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
McKesson & Robbins 
Stirling Homex 
Continental Vending 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westgate 
8. Poor Credit Rating or Financial 
Status 
McKesson & Robbins 
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Footnotes 
1. In addition to the authors of this paper, the research team consisted of David Cherrington 
(Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior—B.Y.U), Reed Payne (Professor Psychology— 
B.Y.U.), and Allan Roe (Criminal Psychologist—Utah State Prison). 
2. A complete bibliography can be found in Albrecht et. al. [1]. 
3. A separate case bibliography is included in Albrecht et. al. [1]. 
4. This checklist is included in Romney et. al. [8]. 
5. While the definition of fraud used in this paper includes only improper action resulting in a 
material misstatement of financial statements, the original research also included a study of major 
embezzlements and defalcations. 
6. Sample sizes were 49 fraud perpetrators, 677 property offenders, and 148 college students. 
7. A full description and analysis of these factors is included in Albrecht et. al. [5]. 
8. See Romney and Albrecht [10]. 
9. In addition to ours, fraud checklists have been prepared by the AICPA, Coopers and Lybrand, 
and Touche Ross & Co. 
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